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CHANCE TO CHANGE: JENNINGS V.
RODRIGUEZ AS A CHANCE TO
BRING DUE PROCESS TO A
BROKEN DETENTION SYSTEM
JOE BIANCO*
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of 1994, INS held fewer than 75,000 noncitizens
in administrative immigration detention;1 in 2013, the number of
detained noncitizens peaked at 440,557 and decreased to about
300,000 in 2016.2 Widespread detention is not only a huge economic
burden, but in some cases detention of noncitizens lasts so long it
becomes a human rights issue.3 For noncitizens, detention is often
determined by a government officer as a matter of routine
paperwork.4 The decision can lead to detention lasting years. The
constitutionality of these detentions is challenged in Jennings v.
Rodriguez, the outcome of which will shape the contours of
immigration detention for tens of thousands of noncitizens. On appeal
from the Ninth Circuit, Rodriguez asks the Supreme Court to decide
whether noncitizens detained under certain statutory provisions are
Copyright © 2017 Joe Bianco.
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2019.
1. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DETENTION NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND BASELINE REPORT 6
(2002).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 6
(Sept. 2014); see also U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING 88 (Jan. 2016) (reporting reduction to 307,310 detainees).
3. See generally Brief of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2016)
(describing how obligations of the United States mandate change in detention for asylum
seekers).
4. Joint Appendix at 255–56, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2016)
(“Specifically, the files of individuals subject to the parole determination process confirm that
they do not receive a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Instead, the files reflect a
Deportation Officer—employed by DHS/ICE—decides whether or not the detainee should be
released, subject to supervisory DHS/ICE officer approval.”) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].

BIANCO FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

38

1/3/2018 5:03 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 13

entitled to bond hearings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), and
what needs to occur at those hearings so that they comply with the
Constitution.5
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Plaintiff, Alejandro Rodriguez, came to the United States as
an infant.6 Based on convictions for possession of a controlled
substance and “joyriding,” the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) initiated removal proceedings against Rodriguez, who was
working as a dental assistant.7 While he contested his removal, he
remained in custody for over three years.8 During that time,
Rodriguez never received a bond hearing.9
Rodriguez is the lead Plaintiff in a class action suit filed on behalf
of approximately 1,000 noncitizen class members who were at some
point detained in the Central District of California for more than six
months without a hearing.10 The class is divided into three
subclasses—the Arriving subclass, Criminal subclass, and 1226(a)
general detention subclass—each based on which immigration statute
authorized the noncitizen’s detention.
Initially, the district court denied class certification, which the
Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the case raised serious
constitutional concerns and the class had no bars to certification.11
Next, the class won a preliminary injunction requiring bond hearings
for the Mandatory and Arriving subclasses, which was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II).12 The injunction
in Rodriguez II explained the procedural safeguards guaranteed by
Ninth Circuit precedent,13 and when these apply in the immigration
context.14 Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant
5. For discussion of constitutional procedural and substantive requirements, see infra
notes 141–142.
6. Respondents’ Brief at 5, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2016)
[hereinafter Respondents’ Brief].
7. Id. at 5–6.
8. Id. at 6. DHS exercised discretionary authority under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2) to release
Rodriguez after he moved for class certification. Id.
9. Id.
10. Brief in Opposition at 6, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. May 10, 2016).
11. Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2010).
12. Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2013).
13. See id. at 1135–36 (discussing how Ninth Circuit has addressed previously
“unanswered” questions regarding immigration detention and the application to the Rodriguez
facts).
14. See id. at 1138–39 (discussing application to mandatory detention, given Supreme
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of class-wide relief with a permanent injunction in 2015.15 This
injunction included procedural safeguards to ensure the enforcement
of the statute comported with Due Process requirements.16 The Ninth
Circuit based their ruling largely on the constitutional avoidance
doctrine.17 The Government appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
and their petition for writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court on June 20, 2016.18
The case was first argued on November 30, 2016.19 Several Justices
expressed concern at oral argument that, because the Ninth Circuit
decided the case on constitutional avoidance grounds, the
constitutional questions were not properly before the Court.20 The
Court subsequently requested supplemental briefing on the issue.21
Specifically, the Court requested briefing on whether the Constitution
itself required bail hearings for class members and whether the
Constitution required the procedural safeguards from the Ninth
Circuit’s decision.22 Supplemental briefs were submitted by both sides,
but no ruling was issued in the Court’s Spring 2017 term. Instead, the
Court ordered re-argument set for October 2017.

Court and other Ninth Circuit precedent).
15. Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted
sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
16. Id.
17. Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1134.
18. Order Granting Certiorari, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. June 20, 2016).
19. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2016)
[hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
20. See, e.g., id. at 46, lines 7–10 (Justice Kennedy); id. at 59 lines 9–13, 63 lines 9–16 (Chief
Justice Roberts) (noting that the constitutional question may not be before the Court).
21. Opinion Requesting Supplemental Briefing, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S.
Dec. 15, 2016).
22. The order reads:
The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following questions:
1) Whether the Constitution requires that aliens seeking admission to the United
States who are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b) must be
afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release into the United States, if
detention lasts six months. 2) Whether the Constitution requires that criminal or
terrorist aliens who are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) must be
afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release, if detention lasts six months. 3)
Whether the Constitution requires that, in bond hearings for aliens detained for six
months under Sections 1225(b), 1226(c), or 1226(a), the alien is entitled to release
unless the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is
a flight risk or a danger to the community, whether the length of the aliens detention
must be weighed in favor of release, and whether new bond hearings must be afforded
automatically every six months.
Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Rodriguez is not the first Supreme Court case to challenge
immigrant detention, but it is the first in over a decade, and it comes
after several jurisdictions have adopted their own approaches.
A. Statutory Regime Governing Detention
The noncitizens who make up the certified class in this case were
detained pursuant to several different statutory provisions.23 The
“Mandatory Subclass” consists of noncitizens living in the United
States who are detained by the DHS after being released from
criminal custody.24 Their detention is mandatory under Section
1226(c), which was added after Congress enacted the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA).25 Sections 1226(c)(1)(A)–(D) enumerate which crimes will
trigger mandatory detention.26 Once detained under 1226(c), aliens
are not eligible for release on bond or parole under Section 1226(a),27
and can only be released if the Attorney General determines release
is necessary for witness protection purposes.28 An alien detained
under Section 1226(c) does not receive a hearing but can challenge his
mandatory detention before an IJ at a “Joseph hearing” at which he
bears the burden of proof to show he is not a flight risk or danger to
the community.29 If the noncitizen wins this appeal, then he can still be
detained under 1226(a).30 The parties contest whether 1226(c)
continues to govern detention once the noncitizen moves into the
regular removal process.
All noncitizens in the “Arriving Subclass” have presented
themselves at a port of entry. Few individuals are detained under the
23. The certified subclasses discussed are the persons in the class relevant to the case on
appeal before the Supreme Court. In Rodriguez III, Rodriguez claimed the class included aliens
detained under Section 1231(a), but the Ninth Circuit decided aliens under 1231(a) were not
part of the class and the injunction does not apply to them. See infra text in note 77.
24. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 2.
25. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, Div. C, Title III, §§ 303(a), 371(b)(5), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-585, 3009-645
(1996).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).
29. See Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (explaining general Joseph
hearing procedures); see also In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999) (establishing need for
Joseph hearing in immigration courts).
30. See Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1078.
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challenged part of the statutory scheme because they are subject to
expedited removal.31 Therefore, only two small groups actually make
up the Arriving Subclass: noncitizens who present some evidence they
are entitled to entry, and asylum seekers who pass a credible fear
interview.32 The first group covers noncitizens in the catch-all bucket
established by Section 1225(b)(2)(A), which states that if an
immigration officer cannot determine the individual is “clearly and
beyond a reasonable doubt entitled to be admitted,” he or she “shall”
be detained under Section 1229(a).33 Although most people detained
under this provision will quickly be subject to expedited removal, the
class in this case includes, among others, legal permanent residents
(LPRs) returning from travel abroad.34 Under the statute, asylum
seekers with credible fear35 and individuals detained under Section
1225(b)(2)(A) can only be released by a parole review, which a DHS
officer conducts.36 In this particular class, over 97% of the Arriving
subclass applied for asylum, and over two-thirds were granted
asylum.37 Individuals detained under Section 1225(b) are not eligible
for relief,38 unless there are medical reasons or they are testifying as a
witness in another case.39 There is no hearing, no neutral decisionmaker, and no appeal.40
The last subclass contains individuals detained under Section
1226(a), which governs aliens “arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.”41 In these cases, an IJ can review custody determinations, and
the noncitizen has the burden of proving that he or she is neither a
flight risk nor a danger to the community.42 Whereas the other
subclasses challenge whether certain groups of people are entitled to

31. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 42.
32. Id. at 3–4.
33. Id. at 3; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
34. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 3–4.
35. Asylum seekers who pass an initial credible fear interview are detained pursuant to
Section 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
36. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 4.
37. See Brief for the Petitioners at 10, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Aug. 26,
2016) [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioners].
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(2).
39. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b).
40. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 4.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).
42. See Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (setting out factors and
burdens in bond determinations).
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hearings, the 1226(a) subclass challenges the hearings themselves.43
Respondents argue that after the specific reasons for detention under
Sections 1225(b) or 1226(c) end, all class members are detained by the
authority of Section 1226(a).44
B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Detention in the Immigration
Context
The Supreme Court has clarified both the scope of immigration
detention and where it brushes up against Due Process in two recent
cases, Zadvydas v. Davis45 and Demore v. Kim.46
In Zadvydas, an alien was detained for several years without a
hearing or a stated government justification.47 Typically, after an alien
is given a final removal order, the alien is detained during a ninetyday “removal period” as the Government determines to which
country the alien should be removed.48 However, because none of the
proposed nations would accept Zadvydas, he was detained by the
government for many years even after he was given his final order of
removal.49 The authorization for detention came from Section
1231(a)(6),50 which allowed detention after the ninety-day removal
expired, and the government argued that that authorization extended
indefinitely.51 Zadvydas and another detainee with similar
circumstances successfully argued that limitless detention
contradicted constitutional guarantees.52 Justice Breyer began the
majority opinion by emphasizing that the deprivation of liberty
without due process of law clearly violates the Fifth Amendment.53
43. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 5.
44. Id. at 33 (“Section 1226(c) authorizes detention for only a reasonable six-month period
of time, after which detention authority derives from Section 1226(a) . . . Sections
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) and 1225(b)(2)(A) authorize detention only prior to commencement of
removal proceedings, after which detention is also governed by Section 1226(a).”).
45. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
46. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
47. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85 (describing facts of Kestutis Zadvydas’s detention).
48. Id. at 683.
49. Id. at 684–85.
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012) (“[T]he [alien] may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision . . . . ”).
51. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (“The Government argues that the statute means what it
literally says. It sets no ‘limit on the length of time beyond the removal period that an alien who
falls within one of the Section 1231(a)(6) categories may be detained.’”) (citation omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 690 (“A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to
‘depriv[e]’ any ‘person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.’ Freedom from
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The Court considered the question of whether these rights were
available to noncitizens at all,54 and determined that because the
people challenging detention in this case were LPRs, not merely
arriving aliens, they must have some due process protections.55
The Court went on to decide that because the statute did not
clearly mandate detention, it was appropriate and necessary to
interpret the statute to avoid serious constitutional issues.56 The Court
concluded that, “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.”57 Habeas
petitions in federal court were considered the appropriate method for
challenging detention, and district court judges were instructed to
consider in each case how the continued detention related to the
statutory purpose.58
Two years later, in Demore v. Kim, the Court added to this rule by
deciding a case where an LPR was detained under 1226(c) while his
removal proceedings were pending.59 There, the LPR challenged his
detention because he had not been given a bond hearing at which the
government must prove that he posed either a danger to the
community or a risk of flight.60 Because Zadvydas had suggested a

imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies
at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects. And this Court has said that
government detention violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in
a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or, in certain special and ‘narrow’
nonpunitive ‘circumstances,’ where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental
illness, outweighs the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.’”) (citations omitted).
54. See id. at 692 (rejecting the Government’s argument “that, from a constitutional
perspective, alien status itself can justify indefinite detention”).
55. See id. at 694 (drawing distinction between noncitizens who are physically present
within the country’s borders and those arriving for the first time).
56. See id. at 699 (“We have found nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly
demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention.
Consequently, interpreting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat, we conclude that,
once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized
by statute.”).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 699–700 (“[T]he habeas court must ask whether the detention in question
exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal. It should measure reasonableness
primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the
moment of removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold
continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute. In that case, of course,
the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised
release that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to
custody upon a violation of those conditions.”).
59. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513–14 (2003).
60. See id. at 514 (“He argued that his detention under § 1226(c) violated due process
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balancing test where the length of detainment should be related to the
purpose, four Circuit Courts had held that detention under Section
1226(c) without an individualized hearing was unconstitutional.61
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished
the situation in Zadvydas from Demore.62 First, in Zadvydas, the
detainees were held for so long because they were unable to be
deported anywhere: the lack of an attainable government goal meant
that detention did not serve a legitimate purpose.63 In Demore,
however, the government still had a valid interest in detaining LPRs
who had committed crimes that qualified them for deportation under
1226(c).64 Justice Rehnquist’s review of the Congressional record
showed that mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) arose from a
concern that once criminal aliens were released on bond, they could
not effectively be deported because they rarely appeared at their
removal hearings.65 Congress’s solution was to detain them while
those hearings were pending.66 Second, the Court found that the
detention in Zadvydas was problematic because it was potentially
“indefinite.”67 The statistics provided to the Court in Demore showed
that in 1226(c) cases, detentions while removal proceedings were
pending lasted for short amounts of time, less than ninety days in
most cases, which was itself less than the six-month period that was
presumed valid in Zadvydas.68
C. Application of Demore and Zadvydas
In the decade and a half since Demore, several Circuits have
acknowledged the constitutional problem posed by long detention,
because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight
risk.”).
61. Id. at 526–27; see, e.g., Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 311 (3rd Cir. 2001).
62. Demore, 538 U.S. at 527.
63. Id. at 527–28.
64. Id. at 528.
65. See id. at 519–20 (“The Vera Institute study strongly supports Congress’ concern that,
even with individualized screening, releasing deportable criminal aliens on bond would lead to
an unacceptable rate of flight.”).
66. Id. at 521 (“Some studies presented to Congress suggested that detention of criminal
aliens during their removal proceedings might be the best way to ensure their successful
removal from this country . . . . It was following those Reports that Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. §
1226, requiring the Attorney General to detain a subset of deportable criminal aliens pending a
determination of their removability.”).
67. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001).
68. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529 (“Under § 1226(c), not only does detention have a definite
termination point, in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days we considered
presumptively valid in Zadvydas.”).
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and have developed their own rules to govern the constitutional limits
on noncitizen detention.69 The Second Circuit adopted the Ninth
Circuit’s rule from the preliminary injunction it issued in Rodriguez
II, as it applies to 1226(c) detainees.70 That “bright-line” rule requires
hearings after six months where the Government bears the burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence.71 The other approach,
adopted by the Third and Sixth Circuits, is a case-by-case approach
requiring every detainee to file a habeas petition in federal district
court.72 The district court then conducts a fact-specific inquiry to
determine whether the detention without a hearing is still
“reasonable” in each case.73
III. HOLDING
Rodriguez III was the final case in the Ninth Circuit’s “decadelong examination of civil . . . detention in the immigration context.”74
Following the preliminary injunction it upheld in Rodriguez II,75 the
Ninth Circuit held that based on both Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit precedent, class members were entitled to bond hearings and
those hearings had to meet specific procedural requirements.76 This
ruling only applied to members of the subclass who were detained
under Sections 1226(c), 1225(b), or 1226(a).77
69. See, e.g., Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 614–15 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2494 (2016) (“[W]hile all circuits agree that section 1226(c) includes some ‘reasonable’ limit on
the amount of time that an individual can be detained without a bail hearing, courts remain
divided on how to determine reasonableness.”).
70. See id. (“[T]he second approach, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, is to apply a bright-line
rule to cases of mandatory detention where the government’s ‘statutory mandatory detention
authority under Section 1226(c) . . . [is] limited to a six-month period, subject to a finding of
flight risk or dangerousness.’”) (quoting Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127,
1133 (9th Cir. 2015)).
71. See id. at 616 (citing protections from Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1331).
72. See Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting case by
case approach); see also Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 474 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2015) (declining to reconsider case-by-case approach in light of decision by Ninth and
Second Circuits); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 267–68 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that Zadvydas
guarantees only that an alien not be held for an unreasonable amount of time, and the proper
avenue of relief is for an alien to file a habeas petition when their detention has become
unreasonable).
73. Diop, 656 F.3d at 234 (holding the reasonableness test is a “fact-dependent inquiry
requiring an assessment of all of the circumstances of any given case”).
74. Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted
sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
75. Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1132–33.
76. Id. at 1074.
77. The Ninth Circuit held the constitutional avoidance doctrine did not mandate
protections for individuals detained under Section 1231(a)—noncitizens who are held subject to
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Based on the Supreme Court’s general jurisprudence on civil
detention, the Ninth Circuit held that there must also be limits and
safeguards on detention in the immigration context.78 The Ninth
Circuit found that the Constitution requires that the detention have
some relationship to a legitimate government goal.79 This rationale
animated the Supreme Court’s decisions in Zadvydas and Demore,80
and the Circuit’s own precedent confirmed that Due Process required
bond hearings when detention became “prolonged”81 (exceeded six
months).82 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit mandated that members of the
class and noncitizens detained in the future under Sections 1226(c),83
1225(b),84 and 1226(a)85 receive bond hearings after six months of
detention. This rule does not put a limit on the time the government
can detain a noncitizen under any of the statutory provisions at issue;
it just requires that once a person has been detained for six months,
the government’s interest in detaining them without a stated
justification has diminished to the point where there must be a
hearing.86 While the statutory language regarding the three subclasses
varies, the Ninth Circuit found that IJs were statutorily authorized to
conduct bond hearings for any of the subclasses.87
In addition to requiring an initial hearing, the Ninth Circuit
mandated additional procedural safeguards to protect the liberties at

final removal procedures. The court found that these people were necessarily excluded from the
certified class in this case, because the certified class was meant to only include individuals who
did not already receive a final order of removal. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1085–86, cert. granted
sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
78. See Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1074–76; see also Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and
Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363 (2014)
(explaining how Supreme Court doctrine suggests the six month rule for detention in the
immigration context).
79. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1077 (“[T]he government is required only to establish that it
has a legitimate interest reasonably related to continued detention; the discretion to release a
non-citizen on bond or other conditions remains soundly in the judgment of the immigration
judges the Department of Justice employs.”).
80. Id. at 1077–78.
81. See Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2008); see
also Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that even where prolonged
detention is statutorily authorized, there must be procedural requirements for the government
to continue to detain an alien).
82. See Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1077–78.
83. Id. at 1078–81.
84. Id. at 1081–84.
85. Id. at 1084–85.
86. Id. at 1077.
87. See id. at 1087–88 (calling attention to IJ responsibility to consider less burdensome
means than detention in making determinations).
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stake.88 The district court had found that although previously,
noncitizens bore the burden of proof at bond hearings, the
Constitution required the government to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the alien is a danger to the community or a
risk of flight.89 The district court’s requirement that IJs consider
“alternatives to detention” was also accepted as it supported the
holding in Rodriguez II that detainees should be released on
“reasonable conditions” even if those conditions consisted of only
electronic monitoring.90 The Ninth Circuit found this would impose a
minimal burden, because IJs likely already considered alternatives to
money bond.91 While the Circuit rejected Rodriguez’s cross-appeal
that IJs be required to consider the likelihood of removal because it
would require too much speculation, the court did require that length
of detention be considered and that detainees receive periodic
hearings every six months.92 Both of these safeguards relate to the
principle that the longer an individual remains detained, the greater
the government’s burden should become to prove that such a lengthy
detention is necessary.93
IV. ARGUMENTS
Although the Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing on
the constitutional questions, the reasoning is similar enough to the
original briefs that each sides’ briefs can be considered together as
one argument.
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
1. Statutory Language
Petitioner’s primary argument is that the statutory language sets
no limits on detention precisely because Congress weighed the
interests and decided that a broad rule of detention was the best way
to achieve its goals.94 Regarding individuals detained under 1225(b),
88. See id. at 1086–89 (addressing each procedural requirement in turn).
89. Id. at 1087.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1088.
92. Id. at 1088–89.
93. See id. at 1089 (“Accordingly, a non-citizen detained for one or more years is entitled
to greater solicitude than a non-citizen detained for six months. Moreover, Supreme Court
precedent provides that “detention incidental to removal must bear a reasonable relation to its
purpose.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 37, at 14 (“Congress weighed the interests in
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Petitioners argue that IJs have no authority to release noncitizens on
bond, because the statute’s mandatory language requires that aliens
seeking admission “shall be detained for a proceeding” when they are
not “clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt” entitled to be
admitted.95 Because the only exception to the statute is parole granted
by the Secretary for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit,”96 Petitioners argue that the requirement of Rodriguez
II that IJs give bond hearings is essentially rewriting Congress’s
legislation.97 Similar mandatory language prevents IJs from granting
bond to 1226(c) aliens, who can be released “only if” the Secretary
decides it is an exception and that the alien does not pose a danger to
the community or flight risk.98 In listing Congress’s interests—
protecting American jobs,99 preventing the frequent flight of
noncitizens awaiting proceedings,100 and preventing recidivism among
criminal aliens detained under 1226(c)101—Petitioners argue that these
policy justifications for Congress’s program should not be re-weighed
and overturned by a court.102
As a fallback position, Petitioners argue that the scheme used by
the Ninth and Second Circuits is simply too broad and results in
improper incentives and results. First, Petitioners believe that the sixmonth rule encourages delay and further litigation by aliens, who can
be admitted to bond and then remain at liberty while their
proceedings are pending.103 Second, if there is to be relief from the
federal courts, it should come from individual habeas petitions where
judges will be able to weigh the merits of each individual case.104
Third, the heightened burden of proof placed on the government will
make it too difficult for the DHS to prove anything, and because the
aliens have better access to information about their own backgrounds

controlling the border, protecting the public from criminal aliens, affording individual aliens
adequate protection and opportunities for relief and review, and minimizing the adverse
foreign-relations impact of U.S. immigration law.”).
95. Id. at 16–17; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
97. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 37, at 20–21.
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).
99. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 37, at 23.
100. Id. at 22 (citing EOIR Report).
101. Id. at 32.
102. See id. at 14 (“The canon of constitutional avoidance is not a tool for courts to
comprehensively rewrite those laws and strike a different balance.”).
103. Id. at 42.
104. See id. at 46–47.
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and experiences, putting the burden on the government will not lead
to the best production of information for the IJ.105
2. Constitutional Question
Petitioners responded to the constitutional questions requested by
the Court by arguing that the current structure has constitutional
safeguards and that the Ninth Circuit’s holding violate the Court’s
precedent and the principle of constitutional avoidance.106
First, Petitioners argue that both 1225(b) and 1226(c) provide
procedure for relief. Detainees under 1225(b) have parole options,107
detainees under 1226(c) can apply for Joseph hearings to challenge
their detention (discussed above),108 and anyone detained under
1226(a) receives individual consideration for release on bond.109
Petitioners argue that these safeguards are sufficient because aliens
lack rights, at least with regard to initial entry.110 While admitting that
problems could arise in some cases, Petitioners argue that broad class
action reform is not the appropriate remedy.111
Petitioners further argue that the Court’s own precedents
illustrate that these procedures are well within constitutional
bounds.112 Because Zadvydas specifically applied to aliens whose
ongoing detention was “indefinite,” there is no constitutional concern
raised by detention of aliens who have pending removal proceedings
under 1225(b) or 1226(c).113 Demore supports this position because it
upheld the detention of an LPR under 1226(c), stating that
“[Congress] may require that persons such as [the LPR] be detained
for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.”114 As
105. Id. at 51.
106. Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Our task is
therefore to determine whether the government’s reading of Sections 1226(c) and 1225(b) raises
constitutional concerns and, if so, whether an alternative construction is plausible without
overriding the legislative intent of Congress.”).
107. Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners at 10–11, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204
(U.S. Jan. 31, 2017) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)(2012)) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief for
the Petitioners].
108. Joseph hearings are a chance for criminal detainees to challenge mandatory detention
where the detainee bears the burden of proving they do not pose a flight risk or danger to the
community. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
109. See 8 C.F.R. 236.1(c)(8) (2016).
110. Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 107, at 20.
111. Id. at 26.
112. See id. at 27 (“In every case in which detention incident to removal proceedings has
arisen, the Court has concluded that it is constitutional.”).
113. See id. at 29.
114. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003).
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Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion, although detention
could at some point “bec[ome] unreasonable or unjustified,”115 such a
concern was not present in Demore and would only occur if there
were “unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and completing the
proceedings.”116 Petitioners argue that here, the detention continues to
be justified by the original reasons that Congress authorized
detention of aliens on arrival.117
With regard to the procedures themselves, Petitioners argue that
the Ninth Circuit’s system—hearings every six months, burden of
proof on the government by clear and convincing evidence, and length
of detention being weighed as a factor—goes beyond any
constitutional requirements.118 This “rigid yardstick” is inappropriate
because it fails to account for the reasons the detention may still be
ongoing, namely that the alien is still appealing or otherwise litigating
his case.119 Furthermore, although protections like the clear and
convincing evidence burden exist in civil contexts,120 Petitioners argue
they are not present for noncitizens detained under 1226(c) based on
Demore, or for arriving noncitizens generally.121
B. Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents advocate for the Ninth Circuit’s rule, both by
rebutting the statutory interpretation and by arguing that the Ninth
Circuit’s rules are required to make the statute’s detention compliant
with the Due Process Clause.
1. Statutory Rebuttal
Respondents challenge Petitioner’s argument that 1226(c) and
1225(b) authorize limitless detention. Respondents argue that both
Criminal and Arriving subclasses are governed only for a brief period
115. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
116. Id.
117. See Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 107, at 31 (arguing that the
government’s interests in protecting the community from crimes by 1226(c) detainees and that
detainees appear at hearings do not end after six months).
118. Id. at 47–55.
119. Supplemental Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 1, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Supplemental Replay Brief for the Petitioner].
120. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (explaining “clear and convincing”
burden in civil detention cases).
121. Supplemental Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 119, at 2; see also Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“This Court has long held that an alien seeking initial
admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his
application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”).
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of time by 1226(c) and 1225(b), and that after that time their
detention is governed by the general detention provisions in
1226(a).122
For criminal aliens detained under 1226(c), Respondents point to
Zadvydas, which noted that Congress did not specify how long
someone could be detained in 1226(c) cases, and that, while six
months was presumptively reasonable, Congress needed more specific
language if it intended to detain someone for a longer duration.123 For
example, Congress did include specific language when it authorized
special detention for aliens accused of terrorist acts under the Patriot
Act.124 In the Patriot Act, Congress provides that the Attorney
General may certify someone as a national security threat125 and that
once someone is so certified, the Attorney General “shall maintain
custody of [the individual] until the alien is removed from the United
States.”126 Respondents argue when Congress wanted to authorize
prolonged detention with limited review, it did so explicitly, and
included safeguards even for those detainees.127 Petitioner’s broad
reading of 1226(c) would render the designation and specific
safeguards superfluous, because under Petitioner’s reading, Congress
already has powers to detain even ordinary criminal aliens for long
periods of time without designation as a national security threat or
procedural protections Congress added with the Patriot Act.128
For arriving aliens detained under the relevant subsections of
1225(b), Respondents note that the provisions, 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) and
1225(b)(2)(A), provide that individuals be detained “for” the
proceedings.129 These are essentially stop-gap provisions that
authorize detention until removal proceedings begin, at which point
detention is authorized under 1226(a).130 Section 1226(a) governs
detention while removal proceedings are “pending,” which
Respondents argue better describes the state of aliens after they have
been determined to have a credible fear, for example.131 Because most
122. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 33.
123. See id. at 34–35.
124. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2012).
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(3).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(2).
127. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 35–36.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 43–44.
130. See id. at 15, 44 (explaining that 1225(b) and 1226(c) only authorize detention until
regular proceedings begin, at which point 1226(a) must govern).
131. Id. at 44; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 49, lines 10–18 (Mr.
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arriving aliens will be “summarily returned to their country of origin”
the stop-gap provided by 1225(b)(2)(A) will only apply to the small
group that qualify for full removal proceedings.132 Therefore,
Respondents argue, Petitioner’s prediction of immigrants arriving at
the border and being released into the country on bail misrepresents
the scope of the potential problem.133
2. Constitutional Question
This statutory interpretation sets up Respondents’ main argument:
prolonged detention, even under 1226(a), is unconstitutional unless
certain safeguards are put into place. Respondents begin with the
argument that “prolonged detention must be supported by an
individualized hearing before a neutral decision-maker,” which is
supported by precedent on civil detention in other contexts.134 They
distinguished Demore as an exception to this general rule, but argue
that the exception was based on false information given to the Court
regarding typical lengths of detention,135 and that, unlike in Demore,
in this case the challengers have viable defenses to removal.136
In contrast to the habeas relief requested by Petitioners,
Respondents argue that a bright-line rule is required to remedy the
constitutional concerns. First, because many detainees are pro se,
lacking any sort of legal resources or knowledge, and often lacking
English-language proficiency, a requirement that a detainee file a
habeas petition in federal court “effectively robs many detainees of
any opportunity for detention review.”137 Review by federal courts
would not only take additional time, but the influx of thousands of
habeas petitions from detained aliens could not be effectively
managed by district judges.138 Respondents note that in other
detention contexts, the Supreme Court has forgone “case-by-case”
analysis where that would be impracticable, and has instead imposed
Arulanantham for Respondents).
132. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 45.
133. See id. at 45 (“Furthermore, the injunction has no effect on the vast majority of
individuals stopped at the border; they are still summarily returned to their country of origin. It
permits release only of the small minority referred for full removal proceedings, detained for six
months, and found by an IJ to present no danger or flight risk.”).
134. See id. at 17–19 (collecting cases).
135. See id. at 19; see also Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 37, at 35 n.10 (“EOIR has
informed this Office that its prior calculations were erroneous.”).
136. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 6, at 19–20.
137. Id. at 26.
138. Respondents’ Supplemental Brief at 45, Rodriguez v. Jennings, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Jan.
31, 2017).
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administrable rules to protect constitutional liberties.139 Moreover, the
bright-line rule produces quicker and more uniform outcomes that
allow parties to shape expectations.140
V. ANALYSIS
In both criminal and civil detention contexts, the Constitution’s
Due Process clause imposes numerous procedural requirements
before the government’s interest in detention can overcome the
fundamental right to be free from physical restraint.141 The
immigration detentions in this case are most analogous to civil
detentions. In civil detention situations, every state and federal court
requires the government to demonstrate that civil commitment is
necessary by “clear and convincing” evidence before depriving
someone of liberty for an extended period.142 Even admitting that the
immigration context poses unique questions,143 a presumptive lack of
citizenship144 does not authorize detainment inconsistent with Due
Process.145
Immigration detention imposes burdens on detainees in numerous
ways. Due to especially poor conditions, it imposes physical and
mental damage on detainees, and when prolonged it can lead to
economic devastation for their families and inhibit their access to the
legal system.146 Forcing noncitizens into this onerous detention system
139. Id. at 41 (collecting cases supporting these procedural requirements).
140. Id. at 47.
141. For criminal context, see for example, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755
(1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception . . . .”); for civil context, see for example, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (discussing narrow circumstances where government detention justifies
overriding the “fundamental nature of the individual’s right to liberty”) (internal quotations
omitted).
142. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (“Having concluded that the
preponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of due process and that the
reasonable-doubt standard is not required, we turn to a middle level of burden of proof that
strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the
state.”).
143. But see generally Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Asian Americans Advancing
Justice in Support of Respondents, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2016)
(arguing that Due Process rights are exactly the same, and that different detention rules for
noncitizens are based in biased and antiquated ways of thinking).
144. Some individuals detained under 1226(c) or 1226(a) may be citizens who were
incorrectly detained.
145. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”).
146. See Brief of 43 Social Science Researchers and Professors as Amici Curiae in Support
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will be justified in some cases. However, such a justification should be
made before a neutral decision-maker and while considering the
noncitizen’s interests in liberty.
When designing that remedy, the Court should consider the
bright-line approach used in the Ninth and Second Circuits, which will
more consistently comply with Due Process than scattered habeas
proceedings in federal court. First, because there is no right to counsel
in the immigration system and most noncitizens are proceeding pro
se,147 an automatic hearing is the only effective way to provide the
right to a hearing. Allowing release during the pre-trial period would
increase access to counsel,148 which would in turn reduce the stress on
IJs to lead detainees through complicated procedure and expedite
resolution of the cases while conserving judicial resources.149 Second,
because most immigration detainees are actually released well before
the six month period expires,150 the classes left in detention often have
more complicated cases with difficult legal or factual questions.151
These cases are often the most meritorious, but they lead to the
longest detention.152
Next, because Due Process requires that detention bear
“reasonable relation” to the government interest,153 the government
must offer a legitimate purpose for detention. Although the
government expresses valid interests in preventing flight and avoiding
of Respondents at 10–25, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2016) (describing
numerous harms imposed by detention).
147. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 32 (2015) (finding only 14% of immigration detainees
were able to retain counsel).
148. See Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal
Proceedings New York Immigrant Representation Study Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV.
357, 367–68 (2011) (“[In New York,] detained individuals with cases adjudicated in New York
Immigration Courts were unrepresented 67% of the time, while nondetained individuals in the
same courts were unrepresented only 21% of the time.”).
149. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nine Retired Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration
Appeals Members in Support of Respondents at 12–15, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204
(U.S. Oct. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Brief by Immigration Judges] (explaining that diligent IJs have
a harder time and expend more resources in complicated cases with noncitizens, and take extra
care to make sure the immigrant gets a fair hearing).
150. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CERTAIN CRIMINAL CHARGE
COMPLETION STATISTICS 2 (Aug. 2016), for data on aliens detained under 1226(c).
151. See Brief by Immigration Judges, supra note 149, at 16–17.
152. See Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 122 tbl. 35 (showing a 35% success rate for class
members, and a 7% success rate for general detainees of the Mira Loma facility in California).
153. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (“At the least, due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed.”).
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danger to the community, denying a hearing is not a legitimate
government interest. Legitimate interests can never be served unless
the government is required to make a showing of why it has chosen to
detain someone.
No one is well served by the current system of detention. Whereas
detention was virtually the government’s only option throughout the
twentieth century, technological advances have made supervised
release far more effective. Noncitizens released on bond often return
for their immigration hearings, and some programs boast “over 99
percent” appearance rates.154 The cost of detention now exceeds $2.2
billion per year, while the cost of the government’s Alternatives to
Detention program is only $126 million.155 Despite being nearly onetwentieth of the cost, the Alternatives to Detention Program has a
daily capacity of 51,000 participants, compared to the 31,000 beds in
permanent detention.156 More recent statistics have shown that IJs are
effective at evaluating whether or not to release detained aliens: in
2015, only 14% of individuals released by an IJ failed to appear at
later proceedings.157 Recidivism among 1226(c) detainees who are
released is also extremely low, less than 14% in 2007.158
Finally, IJs are in the best position to make these decisions. They
have expertise not only in immigration law generally, but also in
setting bail for detainees even when there is little or no information.159
IJs have proven more effective than Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) officers at predicting which individuals will
appear at hearings, achieving an 86% appearance rate as compared to
76.6% for ICE officers in 2015.160 Furthermore, IJs also work with
detainees on other aspects of their cases, and in situations where
information is sparse, familiarity with the detainee herself and the

154. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Rep. No. GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO
DETENTION 30 (2014).
155. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2017 5 (2016).
156. Id.
157. See What Happens when Individuals are Released on Bond in Immigration Court
Proceedings?, app. tbl. 3, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, (Sept. 14,
2016), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/438/ [hereinafter TRAC Report].
158. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
6 (2010).
159. Immigration judges completed over 250,000 total bond hearings in 2012 and 2013. U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013 STATISTICS
YEARBOOK app. A5 (2014).
160. See TRAC Report, supra note 157, app. tbl. 3.
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facts of the case are crucial.161 For these reasons, IJs can achieve better
results than either ICE officers or district court judges.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rodriguez,
as it represents a fair approach to resolving a constitutional failure in
the current immigration system. Given that the Court ordered reargument, it seems likely that the Justices were split 4-4 when the case
was first heard in Fall 2017. If Justice Kennedy sided with the
conservative Justices in that split, it seems probable that with the
addition of Justice Gorsuch, the deadlock will be resolved in the
conservative Justices’ favor. This would likely entail an end to the
bright-line rule, and at best the continued use of the case-by-case
approach in the Third and Sixth Circuits. Although that approach is
better than no relief at all, because it is so difficult for most detainees
to access, there will likely be hundreds if not thousands of noncitizens
who will be detained even though they pose no danger to the
community and little risk of flight.

161. See Brief by Immigration Judges, supra note 149, at 22.

